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Over  the  past  60 years  the  neural  correlates  of  human  episodic  memory  have  been  the  focus
of  intense  neuroscientific  scrutiny.  By contrast,  neuroscience  has  paid  substantially  less
attention to understanding  the  emergence  of  this  neurocognitive  system.  In this  review  we
consider how  the  study  of  memory  development  has  evolved.  In doing  so,  we  concentrate
primarily  on the  first  postnatal  year  because  it is  within  this  time  window  that  the  most
dramatic  shifts  in scientific  opinion  have  occurred.  Moreover,  this  time  frame  includes  the
critical age  (∼9 months)  at which  human  infants  purportedly  first begin  to  demonstrate
rudimentary  hippocampal-dependent  memory.  We  review  the evidence  for  and  against  this
assertion,  note  the lack  of  direct  neurocognitive  data  speaking  to  this  issue,  and  questionEpisodic memory
Navigation
how  demonstrations  of exuberant  relational  learning  and  memory  in infants  as  young  as
3-months  old  can  be  accommodated  within  extant  models.  Finally,  we  discuss  whether
current  impasses  in the  infant  memory  literature  could  be  leveraged  by making  greater  use
of  neuroimaging  techniques,  such  as  magnetic  resonance  imaging  (MRI),  which  have  been
deployed  so  successfully  in  adults.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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. Introduction
“You have to begin to lose your memory, if only in bits
and pieces to realise that memory is what makes our
lives. Life without memory is no life at all.  . .our mem-
ory is our coherence, our reason, our feeling, even our
action. Without it, we are nothing. . ..” (Bunuel, 1983).
The above quotation attempts to describe life without
emory. Similar sentiments have been articulated time
nd time again by those who have suffered memory loss
n adulthood, and studies of amnesic patients have con-
rmed the devastation that severe memory impairment
mposes on people’s lives. And yet, spend time with a young
nfant, who is considered by many to possess the mnemonic
apabilities of a severely amnesic patient (Schacter and
oscovitch, 1984), and it is evident that the sentiments
xpressed above are not apposite (Rovee-Collier, 1997).
nfants are not, as William James (1890) proposed, liv-
ng in a state of ‘blooming, buzzing confusion’. On the
ontrary, they appear to possess a remarkable capacity
o encode and retain knowledge that is appropriate for
heir current needs (Spear, 1984). For instance, shortly after
irth, the human neonate can distinguish its mother’s voice
DeCasper and Fifer, 1980) and learn to modify its suck-
ng behaviour in response to milk reinforcement (Sameroff,
971). By 3- to 4-days-old, it can recognise its mother’s
ace (Bushnell et al., 1989), and by 8- to 10-days-old it can
iscriminate its mother’s breast milk from that of another
other (MacFarlane, 1975). However, in stark contrast to
his mnemonic ability, the human adult will almost cer-
ainly be unable to recollect a single episode from their
nfancy, because during this period the human infant (along
ith many other species) is considered to suffer from a
rofound form of memory loss known as infantile amnesia
Howe and Courage, 1993).
In this review we examine the main theoretical frame-
ork, adapted from the adult literature, that has attempted
o account for these apparent disparities. We  discuss the
uccesses and failures of this approach, and ask whether
mpasses that exist today in the infant memory literature
ould be leveraged by making greater use of neuroimaging
echniques, such as magnetic resonance imaging (MRI),
hat have been deployed so successfully in adults. We
ave much to gain by elucidating memory in infancy and
arly childhood. Knowing what the very young are capable
f encoding and retaining over different time periods
an inform the educational needs of these populations.
n so doing it can guide public policy, for example, by
ighlighting the benefits that early stimulation, enriched
nvironments and varied experience have on the flexibility
nd development of infant memory (Cuevas et al., 2006).
here are also implications for how young children are
ealt with by the legal system, such as the impact of.  .  .  . . .  .  .  . .  . . .  . . .  . .  . .  . . .  . .  . .  . . .  .  . . .  . . .  .  .  . .  . . .  .  .  . . .  . . . .  .  . . . . . . . . . . 26
cross-examination on children’s testimony (Zajac and
Hayne, 2003; Hayne, 2007a). Understanding the matu-
ration of the memory system over time, the interactions
between it and the emergence of other cognitive processes,
such as episodic future thinking and spatial navigation,
could also enhance our understanding of these processes
in the adult brain.
2. Early theoretical influences
The major theoretical influences in the infant memory
literature, as it stands today, can be traced back to 1984
when a number of influential papers on infant memory
were published. Two of these papers (Nadel and Zola-
Morgan, 1984; Schacter and Moscovitch, 1984; see also
Bachevalier and Mishkin, 1982) are directly tied to the
radical shift in the conceptualisation of memory that was
occurring in the adult literature at this time, namely the
move away from considering memory as a unitary entity
(Squire, 2004). The roots of this departure are grounded in
the cognitive and memory profile of one patient in partic-
ular – patient H.M. (Scoville and Milner, 1957). At age 27
H.M. underwent bilateral resection of the medial temporal
lobes (MTL) to treat intractable epilepsy. This rendered him
densely amnesic for new experiences (episodic memories).
On this basis the MTL, and in particular the hippocampus
(Fig. 1), were identified as critical for the successful acqui-
sition and recollection of episodic memories. H.M.’s ability
to acquire new procedural skills such as mirror drawing
(Milner, 1962) pointed to a multiple systems account of
long-term memory. Although this latter implication was
not fully appreciated at the time (because motor memory
was considered to be a special, less cognitive, form of mem-
ory), intact skills in amnesic patients were subsequently
documented across a wide range of perceptual and cogni-
tive tasks (Cohen and Squire, 1980).
These demonstrations, coupled with findings from the
animal literature which indicated that the hippocampus
supports specific types of memory (e.g. Gaffan, 1974; Hirsh,
1974; O’Keefe and Nadel, 1978; Squire and Zola-Morgan,
1983), led to the idea that there were multiple mem-
ory systems (Tulving, 1985). These were subsequently
assimilated into a biological framework that listed the
memory type along with the supporting brain structures
(Fig. 2). In essence, this taxonomy grouped all memory
systems that appeared to be preserved in amnesia (and
in animals with hippocampal lesions) under the umbrella
term ‘nondeclarative memory’ (Squire and Zola-Morgan,
1988). Memory systems which fell under this classification
were defined as memories that could be expressed through
performance rather than recollection. On the other hand,
memories that appeared to be impaired in hippocampal
amnesia were ‘declarative’ in nature (Cohen and Squire,
1980), that is, they involved the conscious recollection
14 S.L. Mullally, E.A. Maguire / Developmental C
Fig. 1. The human hippocampus. The top panel shows the hippocampi cir-
cled in red on sagittal (left), coronal (middle) and axial (right) views from
a  structural MRI  brain scan. The hippocampus is composed of a number of
subfields, CA1, CA2, CA3, which are adjoined by neighbouring areas – the
dentate gyrus (DG), the subiculum (SUB), presubiculum, parasubiculum,
and entorhinal cortex – to form the extended hippocampal formation.
Three-dimensional images of two example hippocampi are shown in the
bottom panel with some of the subregions indicated. From Mullally and
Maguire (2013). (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure
legend, the reader is referred to the web version of the article.)
Fig. 2. A taxonomy of long-term memory together with the brain structures purp
memory can be further decomposed into memory for facts (semantic memory) a
(1996), © National Academy of Sciences.ognitive Neuroscience 9 (2014) 12– 29
of facts and events. Moreover, and unlike nondeclarative
memories, declarative memory was considered to enable
facts and events to be represented in highly linked rela-
tional and flexible networks (Cohen, 1984), a flexibility
that was purported to permit these memories to be
consciously accessed and “declared” (Konkel and Cohen,
2009). Although this was  not the only theoretical account
proposed at the time, all extant views embodied a similar
outlook, i.e. that hippocampal damage compromises some
mnemonic processes while others are spared, and that the
memory system that is impaired involves the represen-
tation of memories that are within conscious awareness
(or explicit memory; Graf and Schacter, 1985). Such
ideas went on to dominant memory research in the adult
literature for many decades (they have been questioned
in recent years – see Maguire and Mullally, 2013), largely
because it provided a useful biological framework by
which memory performance, across an array of different
tasks, populations and species could be classified using a
similar set of concrete criteria (Squire, 2004).
2.1. Multiple memory systems in infants
It is not surprising then that at this time in the 1980s
memory researchers began to ask whether similar disso-
ciations could be observed in infant memory (Nadel and
Zola-Morgan, 1984; Schacter and Moscovitch, 1984). Such
questions came on the back of numerous studies conducted
in the 1970s and early 1980s which started to challenge
the then prevailing view of infant memory, namely that
infants lacked the capacity for long-term memory. These
studies presented clear evidence that even in the ini-
tial hours and days after birth, infants were capable of
learning and expressing knowledge across long periods
of time (Rovee-Collier and Fagen, 1981). However, these
studies often lacked theoretical focus (Fagan, 1984; for
orted to be involved in supporting each system. As illustrated, declarative
nd memory for events (episodic memory). From Squire and Zola-Morgan
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xceptions see Cohen and Gelber, 1975; Olsen, 1976) and
heir findings were typically “accounted for by invoking
 unitary concept of memory” (Schacter and Moscovitch,
984, p. 174). Guided by the current thinking, memory
esearchers examined the infant literature to see if the
pparent absence of certain forms of memory in infants,
oupled with demonstrations of quite strikingly intact
emory, could be explained within the multiple memory
ystem biological framework being advocated at the time.
For example, Schacter and Moscovitch (1984) proposed
hat infants have two memory systems; an early system
hat corresponds to nondeclarative memory (spared fol-
owing hippocampal damage) that is available to infants
rom birth, and a later system that corresponds to declar-
tive memory (impaired following hippocampal damage)
hat is available in the latter part of an infant’s first
ear (at around 8–9 months of age; Kagan and Hamburg,
981). The authors argued that the visual paired com-
arison task (VPC; also referred to as habituation and
ovelty-preference paradigm) typically used to assess
nfant memory (where infants spend less time looking at
 familiar relative to a novel stimulus) actually tapped into
nconscious memory, and therefore did not provide evi-
ence of early hippocampal-dependent memory. Schacter
nd Moscovitch (1984) suggested that this was because
uccessful performance on such paradigms occurs as a
esult of modifications of perceptual-cognitive processes
i.e. priming processes) without any explicit knowledge of,
r any explicit reference to, the study context.
While this proposal made theoretical sense, it is very dif-
cult, if not impossible, to ascertain whether pre-linguistic
nfants have conscious awareness of the study context
r not (Nelson, 1997; Rovee-Collier, 1997; Rovee-Collier
nd Cuevas, 2009). Given that this is the critical dimen-
ion upon which the multiple memory systems account
esides, it is necessary to look for other ways in which
nfant tasks can be accurately classified. In order to achieve
his, Schacter and Moscovitch (1984) proposed what later
ecame known as the ‘parameter’ filter. The logic here is
hat as performance on tasks of declarative memory is typ-
cally influenced by variables such as retention interval,
tudy duration and context changes, whereas performance
n nondeclarative tasks is not, then identifying whether a
ask is impacted by the manipulation of these variables can
ssist the classification of the task as either declarative or
ondeclarative (Hayne, 2007b). Schacter and Moscovitch
1984) reviewed data from numerous VPC studies avail-
ble at the time and concluded that variables such as
etention interval did not appear to alter infants’ per-
ormance (e.g. Fagan, 1971, 1973). This resistance to the
mpact of increasing the retention interval was interpreted
s evidence of the nondeclarative nature of the tasks. This,
herefore, supported the proposal that the early mnemonic
chievements of young infants are attributable to an early,
on-hippocampal-dependent, memory system.
What of the suggested late memory system? Adopt-
ng the parameter filter again, Schacter and Moscovitch
1984) argued that one could examine the effect of modal-
ty shifts between study and test, a manipulation that is
ften detrimental to performance on nondeclarative prim-
ng tasks, but which does not typically impact performanceognitive Neuroscience 9 (2014) 12– 29 15
on declarative memory tasks, to garner such evidence.
Interestingly, novelty preference had been shown to be
eliminated in young infants (6- to 9-months) via a cross
modal switch between study and test, an impairment
which is not evident in older infants (12-months; Gottfried
et al., 1977), when the late (declarative) memory system
has matured sufficiently to support this switch. Thus, ten-
tative evidence appeared to exist in favour of this early/late
memory systems account of infant memory.
Since its proposal almost 30 years ago, this account,
which is often referred to as the neuromaturational account
(Rovee-Collier and Giles, 2010), has received much support
and is still a dominant view in the field of infant memory
(Bauer, 2006, 2008). However, there is controversy sur-
rounding the question of how tasks suitable for use in
infants and young children are classified. Another bench-
mark of declarative memory that is commonly used is the
‘amnesia’ filter (Squire and Schacter, 2002), whereby a task
is considered to be declarative (and hence hippocampal-
dependent) if performance on the same task is impaired in
adult patients with hippocampal amnesia. However, even
with both the ‘parameter’ and the ‘amnesia’ filters in place,
there is still debate about whether some of the key tasks
used in the infant literature should be classified as declar-
ative or nondeclarative. These key tasks include the VPC
paradigms previously discussed, as well as operant condi-
tioning (e.g. the mobile conjugate reinforcement paradigm
– Fig. 3A, and the train paradigm – Fig. 3B; Rovee-Collier
and Hayne, 2000) and imitation protocols. In the latter
tasks, a demonstration of an action or sequence of actions
is given and infants imitate this action either immediately
(elicited imitation), or after a delay period (deferred imita-
tion).
As with the VPC, Schacter and Moscovitch (1984)
argued that the operant conditioning paradigm devised by
Rovee-Collier and Fagen (1981; Fig. 3) is nondeclarative in
nature and thus dismissed the early findings of advanced
mnemonic function in 3- to 5-month-old infants (Rovee-
Collier et al., 1980; Rovee-Collier and Fagen, 1981). Similar
concerns regarding the operant conditioning paradigm
(and in particular the mobile conjugate reinforcement,
Fig. 3A) have been expressed by others (Bauer, 2008) who
argue that such tasks most likely depend upon the cerebel-
lum and deep nuclei of the brain stem, which mature earlier
than the hippocampus, and which most likely support a
primitive, nondeclarative memory system. However, using
the parameter filter, variables such as age, retention inter-
val, study time and context changes have all been found
to influence performance on the VPC, tasks of operant con-
ditioning and imitation procedures (Hayne, 2004; Rovee-
Collier, 1997), suggesting these tasks should be considered
declarative in nature. Similarly, variables that influence
adults’ performance on declarative memory tasks, such as
interference, levels of processing and serial position, also
impact infants’ performance on the deferred imitation task
(Hayne, 2007b), leading to the same conclusion, that all
three of these paradigms appear to tap into declarative, as
opposed to nondeclarative, processes (Hayne, 2004).
The use of the amnesia filter as a tool for classify-
ing these tasks also indicates that the VPC (McKee and
Squire, 1993; Pascalis et al., 2004) and deferred imitation
16 S.L. Mullally, E.A. Maguire / Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience 9 (2014) 12– 29
Fig. 3. The operant conditioning paradigms. (A) The mobile conjugate reinforcement paradigm (Rovee-Collier et al., 1980; suitable for use in 2–7 month
old  infants). The left panel illustrates phase 1: the baseline condition. Here the ankle ribbon is not connected to the mobile so that when the infant kicks
they  do not move the mobile. The middle panel illustrates phase 2, the acquisition phase, where the ankle ribbon and the mobile are connected so that
when  the infant kicks, the mobile conjugately moves. The right panel illustrates phase 3, the retention phase. Here, as in phase 1, the ankle ribbon and the
mobile are not connected. However, if the infant recognised the mobile, they should kick to move the mobile. Memory of the mobile is therefore indexed
by  an increased rate of kicking in phase 3 relative to phase 1. (B) The operant train task (Hartshorn and Rovee-Collier, 1997; suitable for use in 6–24 month
s a basel
 lever pr
in deacold  infants). As with the operant mobile task, phase 1 (left panel) provide
presses  the lever the train does not move. In phase 2 (middle panel), each
infant’s  age). In phase 3 (right panel–the retention phase) the lever is aga
pressing relative to the baseline pressing rate in phase 1.
(McDonough et al., 1995; Adlam et al., 2005) paradigms are
hippocampal-dependent and should be classified as declar-
ative (Nelson, 1995). Of note, the amnesia filter is agnostic
with respect to the classification of the operant condition-
ing task because the mobile task is unsuitable for use in
adult populations (or children over 6 months of age – see
Fig. 3), and after the age of 2 years, participants simply cease
performing the train task, declaring to the experimenter in
phase 3 that the train is broken, or that the batteries need to
be replaced (Hildreth and Hill, 2003; Hsu and Rovee-Collier,
2006). Interestingly, however, Gross et al. (2002) reported
identical results when 6-month-old infants were tested
on both operant and imitation tasks, suggesting that these
two measures may  tap into the same underlying function.
2.2. The emergence of declarative memory
If one accepts that these tasks tap into one underlying
memory system, then the key question is when does the
memory system that supports these tasks become func-
tional? Hayne (2007b) has argued that across multiple
laboratories and studies using the VPC, operant condi-
tioning or imitation paradigms, consistent patterns have
emerged which can be summarised in terms of three gen-
eral principles (Hayne, 2004). First, older infants encode
information faster than younger infants.  For example, using a
VPC task, Fantz (1964) found that 3- to 4-month-old infants
needed more exposure to the familiar stimulus in order to
demonstrate a novelty preference than 4- to 6-month-old
infants, and Rose (1983) reported that 6-month-old infantsine measure. Here the lever is deactivated and therefore when the infant
ess made by the infant moves the toy train for 1 or 2 s (depending on the
tivated and memory for the train is indexed by an increased rate of lever
required a 15 s exposure to the familiarisation stimulus, but
that by 12 months this time had decreased to 10 s. Similarly,
on the mobile conjugate reinforcement task, 2-month-old
infants typically learned the task within 3–6 min  (Davis and
Rovee-Collier, 1983), 3-month-old infants learned within
2–3 min  (Greco et al., 1986), and 6-month-old infants
within 1 min (Hill et al., 1988); and on a task of deferred
imitation, 6-month-old infants required twice as much
exposure to the target actions than older infants (12-, 18-,
and 24-month-olds; Barr et al., 1996). Thus, increasing age
appears to correspond to a shortening of encoding times
across a range of mnemonic paradigms. Second, younger
infants appear to remember for shorter periods of time. Six-
month-old infants imitated actions for only 24 h (Meltzoff,
1988), 9-month-olds recollected actions for up to 5 weeks
(but not 3 months), while just 1 month later, 10-month-
olds could reproduce the same actions for up to 3 months
(Carver and Bauer, 2001; see also Fig. 4). Finally, memory
in younger infants is considered to be highly specific, with
older children utilising a wider range of retrieval cues than
their younger counterparts. For example, in an imitation
task, retrieval is easily disrupted by a change in the cues
between encoding and test (Hayne, 2004; Rovee-Collier,
1997). In addition, Hayne et al. (2000) demonstrated that
when either the form or the colour of a puppet was  changed
at test (relative to the original demonstration), 6- and 12-
(but not 18-) month old infants’ performance at retrieval
was  disrupted, while a major change in context between
the study and the test phases left 6- (but not 12- or 18-)
month old infants impaired.
S.L. Mullally, E.A. Maguire / Developmental C
Fig. 4. Standardised reference functions for the maximum duration reten-
tion  of infants on the operant mobile, operant train and deferred imitation
puppet tasks. Maximum retention duration (x-axis) appears to increase
linearly as a function of increasing age (y-axis). Note that the difference in
the  slope of the two functions is attributed to the different training param-
e
R
t
t
d
o
w
S
r
p
o
t
R
o
a
i
w
F
d
d
t
p
o
s
a
i
o
t
b
e
s
m
a
t
e
s
aters used in these paradigms. This graph has been redrawn exactly from
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he  American Psychological Association.
Evidently, and despite age-related changes across
hese three dimensions, declarative (or hippocampal-
ependent) memory appears to be evident by the middle
f the first year and perhaps even earlier (Hayne, 2007b),
hich is long before the age originally suggested by
chacter and Moscovitch (1984) and advocated more
ecently by others (Bauer, 2006, 2008). Moreover, princi-
les 1 and 2 do not necessarily appear to provide evidence
f an early (or primitive) memory system which gives way
o a late, more sophisticated, declarative memory system.
ather these findings could simply be indicative of a mem-
ry system (which we will, for now, continue to refer to
s a declarative memory system) that is rapidly develop-
ng and increases monotonically throughout infancy but
hich, during this development, is fragile and less efficient.
ig. 4 illustrates the linearity between observed retention
uration (on the operant mobile and train tasks and the
eferred imitation task) and age. No sudden shifts in reten-
ion duration are evident at any age point, which would
resumably be anticipated if a sudden shift between mem-
ry systems was occurring. This unitary interpretation is
upported by the work of Rovee-Collier and colleagues who
rgue that, given sufficient support, the enduring nature of
nfant memory can be enhanced. For instance, 2-month-
lds typically forget the mobile conjugate reinforcement
ask (Fig. 3A) within 1–2 days. However, retention can
e extended if the infant is exposed to regular reminders
very 3 weeks (Rovee-Collier et al., 1999). In fact, in this
tudy, retention was still evident at 7.25 months, a full 4.5
onths after initial acquisition, at which point it could be
ssessed no further due to the inappropriate nature of the
ask for older children. Critically, a control group who were
xposed to the same reminders but not the initial acqui-
ition showed no retention, ensuring that it was the task,
nd not the reminders of the task, that was being recalledognitive Neuroscience 9 (2014) 12– 29 17
at test. Furthermore, in a follow-up study in older chil-
dren (which therefore used the operant conditioning train
paradigm), acquisition of the task occurred when infants
were 6-months-old, followed by five spaced reminders in
the intervening period (with the final reminder occurring at
18-months of age). This resulted in the infants (now 2 years
of age) exhibiting significant retention of the task 1.5 years
after acquisition (Hartshorn, 2003). Therefore, very young
infants (i.e. 2- or 6-month-olds) appear capable of form-
ing enduring memories provided the retention of those
memories is given sufficient support. Why  these memories
require such support remains an open question.
Notably, similar findings have been observed using tasks
of deferred imitation, which are accepted by many to tap
into the declarative memory system (but see Newcombe
et al., 2012). For instance, the retention duration of a multi-
step sequence (remove the mitten from the puppet’s hand,
shake the mitten, replace the mitten; see Fig. 5) can be
increased by manipulating a number of factors. Barr et al.
(2005) observed deferred imitation for at least 10 weeks
after the initial exposure in 6-month-old infants, provided
the infants retrieved the memory of the sequence of actions
on multiple occasions within this 10-week period and that
these retrievals were widely spaced out in time. Similarly,
Campanella and Rovee-Collier (2005) found that 3-month-
old infants retained and imitated modelled actions when
retention was tested 3 months after acquisition, when the
infants were now 6-months-old, provided the memory of
the actions had been periodically reactivated in the inter-
vening time period. Thus, enduring ordered recall is evident
in very young infants and these data (plus the results of
the operant conditioning tasks discussed above) appear
to demand a radical shift in how we conceptualise the
mnemonic capabilities of very young children. Moreover,
they beg questions of the neuroscientific community to
provide explanations of how these memory traces are being
acquired and consolidated in such immature brains.
2.3. The emergence of episodic memory
Until now we have used the term declarative memory to
refer to memories that depend upon the hippocampus. This
is largely because ‘declarative’ memory and ‘hippocampal-
dependent’ memory were once viewed as synonymous
and, although controversial, declarative memory (via the
use of the parameter and amnesia filters) was relatively
easy to assess in infants, as described earlier. However, it is
highly likely that there is more to hippocampal-dependent
memory than declarative processes, and in recent years
the type of memory that has been most associated with
the hippocampus is episodic memory – the memory for
our personal past experiences. Hence, in order to be truly
convinced that young infants are utilising a hippocampal-
dependent memory system then we  need to also look for
evidence of episodic memory in this population.
Some have argued that children under the age of 4- or
5-years of age are unable to form episodic memories (e.g.
Tulving, 2005). Because episodic memory is difficult (if not
impossible) to assess in the absence of language (Clayton
et al., 2003), such studies often utilise ‘episodic-like’ mem-
ory paradigms (for a review see Salwiczek et al., 2010)
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Fig. 5. Sensory preconditioning and the deferred imitation puppet task (Barr et al., 2003). The left panel illustrates the sensory preconditioning whereby
an  infant receives paired pre-exposure to puppet A and puppet B. In phase 2 (middle panel) the target actions (remove the mitten from the puppet’s hand,
shake  the mitten, replace the mitten) were demonstrated for the infant on puppet A. The deferred imitation test then occurs in phase 3 (right panel). Here
ated if t
otorica
lsevier.the  memory of the pairing between puppet A and puppet B is demonstr
performed by infants aged 6 months and above, as younger infants are m
reproduced from Rovee-Collier and Giles (2010) with the permission of E
which attempt to measure the recollection of “happenings
in particular places at particular times” (Tulving, 2002, p.
3), or the ‘what-where-when’ (www) of episodic memory
(Tulving, 1972). While episodic-like memory (or ‘www-
memory’) paradigms have been successfully utilised across
a range of nonhuman species (Clayton and Dickinson,
1998; Ergorul and Eichenbaum, 2004; Martin-Ordas et al.,
2010), more recent studies have employed this approach
to track the emergence of episodic memory across child-
hood. For instance, Hayne and Imuta (2011) developed
a hide-and-seek paradigm to assess young children’s (3-
and 4-year-olds) ability to recollect the ‘www’ of a hid-
ing event, while Bauer et al. (2012) focused their attention
on identifying the point at which the ‘where’ of personally
experienced events is successfully bound with the event
details themselves. In keeping with previous hypotheses
(Tulving, 2002, 2005), this form of memory appears to show
a protracted development throughout early and middle
childhood, although rudimentary episodic memory skills
do appear to be in place by the age of 3 (Hayne and
Imuta, 2011). Interestingly, more recent findings have sug-
gested that it is the ability to retain, as opposed to form,
episodic memories that may  be the source of the advantage
inferred through age in older children, with 3-year-old chil-
dren demonstrating good retention of episodic recollection
across short but not long delays (Scarf et al., 2013).
Interestingly, the ‘www-memory’ approach has firmly
aligned itself with the associative/relational account of
episodic memory (for review see Eichenbaum, 2004).
Under this model, episodic memory processes are consid-
ered to involve the binding together of disparate pieces
of information (the what, where and when) to form a
sequentially organised, novel, associative representation of
the event in question. This associative representation doeshe infant models the target actions on puppet B. This phase can only be
lly incapable of performing the target actions themselves. Lower panels
not, however, occur in isolation; instead it overlaps with
other associative representations that share a common ele-
ment (e.g. with episodic memories that have occurred in
the same location). In this way, common elements serve
to organise episodic memories into relational networks,
linking new and existing memories to one another. Such
networks enable the individual to compare and contrast
memories, to make inferences among indirectly related
episodic events, and even to form expectations about future
experiences. It is this flexibility, ultimately afforded by the
associative nature of episodic memory, that is considered
by many to be a fundamental feature of hippocampal-
dependent memory (Eichenbaum, 2004). Hence, it can be
appreciated why  many developmental scientists consider
that at its heart, the development of episodic memory “is
the development of the ability to bind together informa-
tion co-occurring at a particular time in a particular spatial
context” (Newcombe et al., 2012, p. 75) and why  relational
memory is considered to be a canonical form of episodic
memory (Koski et al., 2013). The question is, therefore, at
what age do basic associative/relational processes become
apparent, and can we use this as evidence of episodic-like
memory abilities in infancy?
As previously discussed, one characteristic of infants’
memory performance on the tasks described earlier is
that it appears to be highly specific and inflexible (Hayne,
2004, principle 3 above), and hence incompatible with
the above characterisation of episodic memory. However,
recent demonstrations suggest that under certain condi-
tions, and contrary to these earlier findings, very young
infants can (1) form spontaneous and enduring associ-
ations, and (2) are capable of using these associative
representations in a flexible manner. For instance, using the
mobile conjugate reinforcement paradigm in combination
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Fig. 6. (A) The hypothesised associative representation containing each element of the event sequence depicted in Fig. 5 – the deferred imitation puppet
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 and puppet B (encoded by the infants during the sensory pre-conditio
ssociations (associations bound to puppet A) across contexts (to puppet
ith a sensory pre-conditioning phase (where the infants
ere pre-exposed to the study and test contexts, which in
his case were two distinctive cloth panels), Boller (1997)
ound that 6-month-old infants continued to show sig-
ificant retention of the mobile task (Fig. 3) despite a
hange in context between study and test. Critically, this
as only observed for the infants who were pre-exposed
o the cloth panels simultaneously; with the typical pat-
ern of impairment evident in the control infants who had
een pre-exposed to the two contexts individually but
ot simultaneously. Thus, the pre-exposed infants seemed
o spontaneously form a lasting association between the
ontexts in the sensory pre-conditioning phase, and this
ssociative representation appeared sufficient to enable
hem to demonstrate a flexibility often assumed to be
bsent in young infants’ memory. Similarly, Barr et al.
2003) pre-conditioned 6-month-old infants to two hand
uppets (A and B; see Fig. 5A, left panel) using a simi-
ar simultaneous presentation technique. The infants then
bserved a sequence of three target actions (i.e. remove the
itten from the puppet’s hand, shake the mitten, replace
he mitten) demonstrated on puppet A (Fig. 5A, middle
anel). Twenty-four hours later this group of infants spon-
aneously imitated these actions on puppet B (Fig. 5A,
ight panel) thus demonstrating a transfer of knowledge
rom puppet A to puppet B. Critically however, infants
ho had the same amount of pre-exposure to puppets A
nd B, but not simultaneous pre-exposure, did not model
he actions on puppet B, suggesting these control infants
ad not formed an association between puppets A and
, and that the absence of this association rendered the
emory isolated and non-transferable. Importantly, the
pecificity demonstrated by the control infants (and those
n previous studies, e.g. Hayne et al., 2000), in tandem with
he flexibility demonstrated by the experimental infants,
rgues against the suggestion that infants under the age
f 2 years form only generalised or semantic representa-
ions of event sequences (Newcombe et al., 2012). This is
ecause the above pattern of results demands that both
roups’ recollection of the original event sequence must
ecessarily have contained specific item details, i.e. the
dentity of puppet A (Fig. 6). Hence, it is plausible that theseelational network which also contains the association between puppet
ase), which subsequently enables the infant to transfer context-specific
infants formed an associative representation of the event
sequences, which in the case of the experimental group,
was subsumed into a larger relational network that also
included the association between puppet A and puppet B
(Fig. 6B). Thus, these fundamental associative elements of
episodic memory may  in fact be present in 6-month-old
infants.
Interestingly, spontaneous associative learning is also
evident in even younger infants. For instance, Campanella
and Rovee-Collier (2005) found that 6-month-old infants
spontaneously imitated target actions on puppet B, even
though the simultaneous pre-exposure to the puppet pair
(i.e. to puppets A and B), and the modelling of the target
actions on puppet A, had occurred 3 months earlier, when
the infants were just 3-months-old. The transfer of learn-
ing from puppet A to puppet B observed here occurred
in spite of a 3-month delay between the sensory pre-
conditioning phase, where the association between the
puppet A and puppet B was learned, and the test phase
(note, memory of the target actions was periodically reac-
tivated with puppet A during this time). As before, the
infants who  had sequential but not simultaneous pre-
exposure to puppets A and B did not model the actions
on puppet B in phase 3 despite the fact that they (like
the simultaneously pre-exposed group) had observed the
target actions performed on puppet A on multiple occa-
sions.
These results demonstrate that even 3-month-old
infants seem capable of forming spontaneous associations
between simultaneously occurring events and appear to
use this associative knowledge flexibly in a novel context.
But do these infants also form associations between items
that have never been previously encountered together
which, as discussed above, is often considered a key feature
of a flexible memory system (Eichenbaum, 1997; Squire
and Kandel, 1999)? Tasks where associations between
indirectly related stimuli must be inferred are known as
transitive inference tasks and the acquisition of transitive
inferences was once considered to emerge around 7 years
of age (Piaget, 1928; Townsend et al., 2010). Cuevas et al.
(2006), however, tested whether such flexibility could be
demonstrated in 6-month-old infants.
mental C
2012; see also Wills et al., 2010; Langston et al., 2010)
with all the basic components of a rat’s hippocampal nav-20 S.L. Mullally, E.A. Maguire / Develop
Here, the infants were simultaneously exposed to pup-
pets A and B (phase 1: association between puppet A and B
presumed to be formed) and then trained to kick a mobile
in a distinctive context 24 h later (phase 2: association
between mobile and context presumed to be formed). A
third phase then ensued where the infants were exposed
to puppet A (without the presence of puppet B) in the
distinctive context (without the presence of the mobile).
Thus in phase 3, the presence of puppet A was  presumed
to activate the associated memory of puppet B, while the
distinctive context was presumed to activate the associ-
ated memory of the mobile. The question was whether this
would lead to the formation of a new association between
the co-activated memory representations (puppet B and
the mobile) despite the fact that neither puppet B nor the
mobile were ever physically presented together. Interest-
ingly, this was what Cuevas et al. (2006) found. Moreover,
this association appeared to persist for up to 2 weeks.
Therefore, under certain conditions, very young infants’
memory appears to be far from rigid and specific.
However, what about the previously-described findings
that failed to find evidence of flexibility in infant mem-
ory (e.g. Hayne et al., 2000)? One explanation proposes
that it is infants’ lack of world knowledge and experi-
ence (Rovee-Collier and Cuevas, 2009) that is the source
of this apparent inflexibility. For example, Richmond and
Nelson (2007) proposed that the inclusion of a sensory
pre-conditioning phase where the infants learned about
the relationship between two items (e.g. between puppet
A and puppet B), provides the prior knowledge, or rela-
tional network, into which the novel event (or associative
representation) can be embedded. This then enables the
infant to demonstrate these surprisingly advanced forms
of relational memory. Hence, in experimental contexts
where this support is absent, infants may  lack a sufficiently
rich network of knowledge within which to integrate the
event, and the absence of this knowledge-based network
renders the memory isolated and inflexible (Barr et al.,
2011). In support of this idea, Richmond and Nelson (2007)
cited the observation that 9-month-old infants who are
able to crawl and likely acquire a richer representation
of their environment (or the ‘where’ of their episodic
memories) than their non-crawling counterparts appear
to be more capable of using their memory in a flexible
manner than infants who are not yet crawling (Herbert
et al., 2007). In a similar vein, Jones et al. (2011) sought
to determine whether the limitations in representational
flexibility (i.e. the failure to recognise previously viewed
stimuli when presented on a new background) observed in
infants younger than 18-months by Robinson and Pascalis
(2004) could be overcome by the provision of variabil-
ity training during encoding (i.e. the presentation of the
studied item on multiple backgrounds). Significantly, they
demonstrated that this training enabled infants as young
as 6-months-old to recognise the studied item when it
was subsequently presented on a novel background. Such
findings are consistent with the proposal that an apparent
inflexibility in infants’ memory may  be driven by their lack
of world knowledge and experience, and not necessarily
by an absence of a flexible associative/relational memory
ability.ognitive Neuroscience 9 (2014) 12– 29
2.4. A transitional age in the ontogeny of episodic
memory?
While there is evidence that very young infants may
be capable of impressive mnemonic feats (including flex-
ibility), it is perhaps noteworthy that infants begin to
crawl and hence gain the associated cognitive benefits
of independent locomotion at ∼9 months. This is inter-
esting as 9-months has been consistently described by
memory theorists as a critical transitional age whereby
infant memory appears to undergo a radical develop-
ment. As previously described, many have argued that at
this age one memory system (an early developing non-
declarative memory system) is supplanted by another (a
late developing declarative memory system; Schacter and
Moscovitch, 1984; Bauer, 2006, 2008), or a pre-explicit
memory system is supplanted by an explicit one (Richmond
and Nelson, 2007), while others have described this as the
age at which the period of exuberant associative learn-
ing observed in early infanthood appears to come to an
end (Rovee-Collier and Giles, 2010). Additional evidence
that this represents an important developmental age in
the ontogeny of hippocampal-dependent memory comes
from the work of Bauer and colleagues (Carver et al., 2000).
They found that 9-month-old infants who  successfully
imitated previously-learned event sequences also showed
brain activity patterns consistent with recollection (i.e. a
late positive slow wave component of the ERP response;
Paller and Kutas, 1992), which was  lacking in the 9-month-
old infants who did not imitate (Carver et al., 2000) and
in amnesic patients (Düzel et al., 2001; Addante et al.,
2012). Richmond and Nelson (2009) recently utilised an
eye-tracking technique (previously employed to investi-
gate relational memory in adult amnesia; Hannula et al.,
2007), to demonstrate that 9-month-old infants can encode
the relations among items (i.e. between novel faces super-
imposed on unique scenic backgrounds; but see also Koski
et al., 2013). However, it is unclear from these data sets
whether infants below the age of 9-months would also
demonstrate a late positive slow wave (ERP) or show evi-
dence of successful relational encoding (eye tracking).
Nevertheless, the fact that Herbert et al.’s (2007) find-
ings tentatively linked the emergence of flexible memory
to the onset of independent locomotion resonates with a
hypothesis proposed by Nadel and Zola-Morgan (1984).
They argued that true episodic memory (that encapsulates
the ‘when’ and ‘where’ of the recollected episode) will only
be possible once an organism is capable of hippocampal-
dependent place learning (i.e. allocentric spatial learning).
In support of this they cited findings from the animal lit-
erature demonstrating that place learning appears quite
abruptly on postnatal day 19 in the life of a rat (e.g. Suther-
land, 1982, personal communication; cited in Nadel and
Zola-Morgan, 1984), and linked this form of learning with
the emergence of the hippocampal memory system. This
coincides with more recent observations that adult-like
grid cells first emerge on postnatal day 19 (Wills et al.,igation system in place by 3 weeks of age, which is also
the age at which weanlings first start to leave their nest
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Gerrish and Alberts, 1996) to begin independent spatial
xploration. (Note: this is also the age at which the effects
f rat infantile amnesia begin to dissipate, with infantile
mnesia appearing strongest in rat pups <21-days-old; for
eview see Callaghan et al., 2014). Prior to the emergence of
his place learning, Nadel and Zola-Morgan (1984) argued
hat although the experiencing of events will influence
n organism (and ‘leave behind some residue’), true “in
lace” memory will not be evident, which resonates with
he hypothesis that prior to the advent of crawling in a
uman infant’s life, memory appears to be inflexible and
omewhat improvised. In this way, independent locomo-
ion may  herald the development of more sophisticated
patial knowledge, which in turn may  provide the scaffold-
ng (the “in place” or the “where” component of episodic
emory) necessary to support flexible and complex recol-
ections of past experiences.
Returning to the idea that 9-months of age represents
he end of an period of exuberant associative learning,
eynolds and Rovee-Collier (2005, cited in Rovee-Collier
nd Giles, 2010) found that both 6- and 9-month-old
nfants who were simultaneously pre-exposed to puppet
 and puppet B (Fig. 5), and who observed target actions
erformed on puppet A, recollected and performed the
odelled actions on puppet B after a 2 (but not a three)
eek delay. Twelve-month-old infants however failed to
emonstrate the actions after any delay. This raises the
nteresting possibility that very young infants may  actu-
lly form more spontaneous associations and retain these
ssociations for longer time periods than older infants. Sim-
larly, Cuevas et al. (2009; cited in Rovee-Collier and Giles,
010) found that while 6-month-old infants associated the
wo puppets following simultaneous but not sequential
re-exposure, 9-month-old infants associated the puppets
fter either simultaneous or sequential pre-exposure, but
2-month-old infants only associated puppets that had
een sequentially, but not simultaneously, presented. This
uggests that there is a change in what infants sponta-
eously associate before and after this critical age period.
his has led some to propose that the exuberant learning
hich appears to occur in very early infancy spontaneously
nds around the transitional age of 9 months (Rovee-Collier
nd Giles, 2010). Understanding the neural events that
ccur prior to, during, and after this transitional period is
ver, could shed important light on the neural substrates
nderpinning both of these phases and help to address the
uestion of whether this represents a fundamental shift
etween memory systems or an incremental change within
he infants’ fledgling episodic memory system. Regardless,
he above findings suggest that very young infants are
otentially utilising a more sophisticated form of memory
han many theories of early memory development would
uggest.
How close do these data move us towards under-
tanding whether very young infants have a functional
pisodic memory system? In other words, is evidence
hat very young infants are capable of forming and rec-
llecting complex relational memories akin to providing
vidence that these infants are forming and subsequently
ecollecting complex episodic memories? Many would
rgue that this is not sufficient. For instance, the questionognitive Neuroscience 9 (2014) 12– 29 21
of whether successful performance on a ‘www-memory’
paradigm is analogous to true episodic memory has been
fiercely debated in the literature (for review see Salwiczek
et al., 2010). Moreover, Tulving’s original ‘www-definition’
of episodic memory (Tulving, 1972) has been updated
a number of times so that it now includes a conscious
awareness that an event is ‘remembered’ as opposed to
being simply familiar or ‘known’ (autonoetic conscious-
ness; Tulving, 1985), and an ability to use episodic memory
to project oneself into both the past and future (chrones-
thesia; Tulving, 2002). Strict adherence to such a complex
and linguistically-dependent definition of episodic mem-
ory makes establishing whether episodic memory defined
along these dimensions is present in very young infants
almost impossible (although a number of researchers have
attempted to explore it in children aged 3-years and
older; e.g. Scarf et al., 2013; Russell et al., 2010; Busby
and Suddendorf, 2005). Can any evidence of a functioning
episodic memory system be gathered by studying chil-
dren’s earliest memories? And if such evidence is present,
how can the above reports of flexible associative mem-
ory in early infancy be reconciled with the phenomenon
of infantile amnesia?
3. Children’s earliest memories
The offset of infantile amnesia occurs between 3 and 5
years of age, and this offset is often considered to herald the
onset of a memory system capable of supporting enduring
episodic memories. Support for this comes from a century
of empirical evidence. In one such study, college students
were asked to recollect childhood memories of significant
early life events (such as the birth of a sibling, the death
of a close relative, a period of hospitalisation; Usher and
Neisser, 1993). Despite the dramatic nature of these events,
participants rarely reported any memories prior to the age
of two, and only incomplete memories until the age of four,
and thus conformed to most adults’ subjective experience
of infantile amnesia. However, there is an important caveat
in the infantile amnesia literature in that most studies have
been conducted in adult populations. Such studies cannot
therefore address the question of whether children them-
selves experience the same degree of infantile amnesia. In
respect of this, Sheingold and Teeney (1982) found that
young children recalled little of a sibling’s birth if this birth
occurred prior to their 4th birthday, and this did not appear
to be related to the participant’s age at the time of testing
(which ranged from 4- to 12-years of age). This appeared
to confirm the findings of studies conducted in adults.
However, a different picture begins to emerge when
children’s earliest episodic memories are specifically tar-
geted. Peterson et al. (2005) found evidence to suggest
that the age of a child’s earliest episodic memory is influ-
enced by that child’s current age, with younger children
appearing capable of recollecting memories from signif-
icantly younger ages than older children. Similarly, in a
recent and comprehensive investigation of the offset of
childhood amnesia in developmental populations, Tustin
and Hayne (2010) found that the earliest memories accu-
rately reported by children and adolescents occurred at
significantly younger ages than the traditional 3.5-year-old
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Table 1
Distribution of early memories from the 0 to 12 months of age time bracket.
Participant age
Age of memory 5-years 8–9 years 12–13 years 18–20 years Total
0–1 months 4 4
1–2  months
2–3 months 1 1 2
3–4  months
4–5 months
5–6 months 1 1
6–7  months
7–8 months
8–9 months
9–10 months
10–11 months
11–12 months 1 1
Total  3 5 0 0 8
Tustin and Hayne, personal communication; taken from Tustin and Hayne (2010).
Of  the 8 early memories that were recollected by participants, all but one occurred prior to the age of 6-months of age. Significantly, these very early memories
ds and t
d betwewere  only provided by the two youngest age groups tested (the 5 year ol
two  older groups (the 12–13 year olds and the 18–20 year olds) occurre
within  the above time frame.
boundary of infantile amnesia observed in adults. In fact,
both groups of children, who were either 5-years-old or 8-
to 9-years-old at the time of testing, had an average age for
their earliest memory of less than 2 years, and in 12- to 13-
year-olds this rose slightly to 2.5-years of age. Interestingly,
in the same study, Tustin and Hayne (2010) also elicited
early memories of episodic events that had occurred prior
to their participants’ 3rd birthdays. When these data were
combined, the earliest memory of some children, who were
under the age of 10 at the time of testing, was for events that
had occurred when they were less than 1-year-old. In fact,
memories of episodic events occurring between birth and
1-year of age accounted for over 20% of all the early mem-
ories given by these children. When inspected further, all
but one of these very early memories occurred before the
age of 6-months (see Table 1; Tustin and Hayne, personal
communication). More striking still was the observation
that 50% of these very early memories were of events that
had occurred when the children in question were less than
1-month-old. These memories were accurate (verified by a
parent) and episodic in nature. These findings, albeit from
one study, therefore suggest that extremely young infants
are potentially capable of encoding a proportion of their
personal experiences from birth, and that at least some of
these memories can be later recollected in an episodic man-
ner up to 8- or 9-years later, potentially challenging the
previous theoretical accounts of infant memory (see also
Jack et al., 2012).
Why  these memories are sparse and why after the age
of 10 these memories then become inaccessible or forgot-
ten are intriguing questions. One possibility is that very
early episodic memories are not encoded as successfully
or as completely as later memories (Tustin and Hayne,
2010). While this fits with a model of episodic memory
that does not become fully functional until late into the
first decade of life (Bauer et al., 2012), it does not accord
with findings from rodent models of infantile amnesia,
whereby rats demonstrate profoundly impaired long-term
memory for events occurring in early life (<21 days)
despite having previously demonstrated successful initialhe 8–9 year olds). The earliest memories provided by participants in the
en their 1st and 2nd years of life and hence they reported no memories
encoding (for a review see Callaghan et al., 2014). It is thus
possible that human infants are successfully encoding the
events of their early lives in an episodic manner, but that
due to insufficient or disrupted consolidation processes,
these memories are latter inaccessible. Why  some of these
memories remain accessible in some children for almost a
decade before succumbing to what seems like an inevitable
fate, represents an intriguing avenue of episodic memory
research and is one which could potentially offer mecha-
nistic insights into how episodic memories are successfully
encoded, maintained and later recollected across a lifetime.
Interestingly, the neuroscientific community have very
recently begun to recognise the potential of acquiring an
in-depth understanding of the phenomenon of infantile
amnesia. For instance, Josselyn and Frankland (2012) pre-
sented a novel proposal – the neurogenic hypothesis –
which argues that despite normal (or near normal) ini-
tial memory formation in the infant brain, the integration
of new neurons (neurogenesis) during development sub-
sequently degrades the memory either by increasing the
excitability of the hippocampal memory network or by
replacing synaptic connections in pre-existing hippocam-
pal circuits. As such, this theory essentially asserts that
the high levels of hippocampal neurogenesis renders “all
hippocampal memories destined to fade as they succumb
to neurogenesis-induced decay” (Frankland et al., 2013,
p. 5). This hypothesis can potentially account for why
young children may  retain the ability to recollect some
very early memories while older children and adults cannot
(see Callaghan et al., 2014, for a description of alterna-
tive molecular mechanisms underlying infantile amnesia).
Considering the complex way in which human episodic
memory is often defined, perhaps elucidation of its early
ontogeny cannot be achieved through behavioural test-
ing alone. Drawing inspiration from these neuroscientific
explanations of infantile amnesia, we  wonder if a full
understanding of episodic memory throughout infancy and
childhood will only be forthcoming when the development
of the neural system supporting these functions is also
taken into account.
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. Anatomical development
.1. The structural maturation of the hippocampus
Theories advocating the delayed emergence of a
ippocampal-dependent memory system were initially
upported by anatomical findings in rats. Infant rats have
ery immature MTL  structures and this was assumed to
e also true of human infants (Bachevalier, 1992). But
ippocampal development in human infants is actually
ore advanced (Seress, 2001), with only 15%, as opposed
o 85%, of granule cells in the dentate gyrus being formed
ostnatally in the primate relative to the rodent hip-
ocampus (Bayer, 1980; Rakic and Nowakowski, 1981).
owever, this protracted postnatal development of the
ytoarchitecture of the dentate gyrus (the major route into
he hippocampus) and a delayed maturation of hippocam-
al inhibitory interneurons (Seress et al., 1993), have
ed some to suggest that true hippocampal-dependent
dult-like memory should not be expected earlier than
–5 years of age (Seress and Abraham, 2008; Seress, 2001;
uttenlocher and Dabholkar, 1997; Lavenex and Banta
avenex, 2013), an age that corresponds with that accepted
or the offset of infantile amnesia.
Interestingly, in a systematic study of the structural and
olecular changes that occur postnatally in the hippocam-
al formation of the rhesus macaque monkey, Lavenex and
anta Lavenex (2013) identified three distinct hippocampal
ircuits that appear to show a differential rate of postnatal
aturation. First, and consistent with previous observa-
ions, Lavenex and Banta Lavenex observed a protracted
evelopment in the dentate gyrus (which they propose
ay  persist for the first decade of human life), and an
ccompanied late development of specific layers located
ownstream of the dentate gyrus, particularly in the CA3
egion. In contrast, they noted that distinct layers in several
ippocampal regions that receive direct projections from
he entorhinal cortex (such as CA1, CA2 and subiculum)
ppear to show early postnatal development. Moreover,
he highly interconnected subcortical structures (subicu-
um, presubiculum, parasubiculum and CA2) seemed to
evelop even more rapidly, with tentative evidence of
egressive events in the structural maturation of presubic-
lar neurons. The culmination of these findings led the
uthors to conclude that “differential maturation of distinct
ippocampal circuits might underlie the emergence and
aturation of different ‘hippocampus-dependent’ memory
rocesses, ultimately leading to the emergence of episodic
emory concomitant with the maturation of all hippocam-
al circuits” (Lavenex and Banta Lavenex, 2013, p. 9).
.2. The neural correlates of infant memory
It is therefore possible that young infants may  acquire
ssociative representations and flexible relational net-
orks using the same ‘traditional’ associative learning
echanism used by adults, which are presumed to sup-
ort episodic memory, and depend upon the hippocampus.
f the human hippocampus matures in a similar way to
he macaque, these memories’ vulnerability to long-term
orgetting could be due to an incomplete functioning ofognitive Neuroscience 9 (2014) 12– 29 23
the hippocampal circuitry. In other words, the continued
benefit brought to memory with increasing age could be a
consequence of the coming online of additional hippocam-
pal circuits and the concomitant increasing cohesiveness
of hippocampal function.
Alternatively, the absence of a fully integrated and func-
tional hippocampus in early infancy could indicate that
the complex associative processes that are taking place in
early infancy are not in fact supported by the hippocampus.
For example, this learning may  potentially be supported
by a “fast mapping” mechanism which permits the rapid
acquisition of novel associations and which, unlike tradi-
tional associative learning mechanisms, does not appear to
depend upon the hippocampus (Sharon et al., 2011). The
term fast mapping was coined to describe infants’ rapid
acquisition of words following brief exposure time (Carey
and Bartlett, 1978), and since then it has been hypoth-
esised to be the general learning mechanism (Markson
and Bloom, 1997) via which very young infants can per-
form these mnemonic feats (Rovee-Collier and Giles, 2010).
Another possibility is that the formation of these novel
associations is supported by extra-hippocampal regions
within the MTL, such as the perirhinal cortex, which have
been shown to support the rapid encoding of novel item
pairs into single compound (or unitised) units (Haskins
et al., 2008). Importantly, this form of associative learn-
ing appears to support familiarity-based recognition, and
not the rich contextually-bound recollection that under-
pins episodic memory (e.g. Quamme  et al., 2007). Hence,
determining the nature of the associations encoded by very
young infants may  be of critical importance in enhancing
our understanding of the relationship between the ability
to form complex associative memories in early childhood,
and the very early ontogeny of episodic memory.
The issues alluded to above remain unresolved because
we have never directly examined the functionality of the
human infant hippocampus in vivo. Instead, the infant
memory field has depended on drawing inferences about
the functions of the developing hippocampus by using
out-dated theoretical frameworks adapted from the adult
literature, such as using the concept of consciousness,
to determine whether a task taps into hippocampal-
dependent memory or not. This strategy is problematic
because there is every chance these frameworks are
inadequate, and indeed there are numerous examples of
hippocampal-dependent nondeclarative memory in the
adult literature (e.g. Chun and Phelps, 1999; Ryan et al.,
2000; Ryan and Cohen, 2004). This approach is less prob-
lematic in the adult literature because the field is actively
working with these concepts while simultaneously pursu-
ing biological evidence for or against these ideas. However,
in the infant memory literature, where direct neuropsycho-
logical or neuroimaging evidence is rarely acquired, these
concepts are essentially presented as the ground truth. One
then takes a task, classifies it using tools like the ‘parame-
ter’ and the ‘amnesia’ filters, and then uses its classification
to inform about the underlying infant brain development.
While inferring hippocampal functionality in the infant
through cognitive testing and inference alone may have
been appropriate three decades ago (when Schacter and
Moscovitch, 1984, proposed their model), surely in this
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era of advanced, non-invasive neuroimaging techniques we
should be attempting to ask more sophisticated and poten-
tially more useful questions of this developing system. In
this way, the infant memory literature could be unshackled
from terms like declarative, explicit and conscious mem-
ory, terms which have caused theoretical divides within
the literature. Moreover, when we attempt to address the
question of the ontogeny of episodic memory, we  run
into similar problems, caused primarily by the demand
placed on researchers to find evidence of complex cogni-
tive processes considered to tap into the defining qualities
of episodic memory, such as autonoetic consciousness
(Tulving, 2005). Could many of these problems be miti-
gated by using neuroimaging techniques to directly study
the emergence of episodic memory?
4.3. Neuroimaging the ontogeny of episodic memory
Of course, imaging infants and very young children
using techniques such as MRI  is not without its challenges
(Raschle et al., 2012), especially if we wish to explore
cognitive processing in the non-sedated infant. However,
these challenges are not insurmountable. Functional MRI
(fMRI) data have been successfully acquired in both non-
sedated spontaneously sleeping infants (e.g. Leroy et al.,
2011; Anderson et al., 2001) and awake infants (albeit
with a high attrition rate; Dehaene-Lambertz et al., 2010).
If we are interested in understanding the ontogeny of
episodic memory from a neurocognitive perspective, then
the benefits of such an approach are obvious, enabling
as it would a host of new and exciting questions to be
posed. The most basic issue concerns the developmental
trajectory of the hippocampus and the various hippocam-
pal subfields. For instance, using high-resolution structural
MRI  (Bonnici et al., 2012a), we could ask whether or not
these distinct regions mature at different rates (as sug-
gested by the monkey work of Lavenex and Banta Lavenex,
2013) and observe and quantify the postnatal structural
changes that occur within the hippocampus and related
MTL  structures. In this way, high-resolution longitudi-
nal data acquired throughout infancy and into childhood
could track the developmental trajectory of these struc-
tures. Moreover, it would extend the interesting findings
of Gogtay et al. (2006) who demonstrated, using structural
MRI, that although the volume of the human hippocampus
remains remarkably heterogeneous between the ages of 4
and 25 years, significant differences are evident between
the posterior (which increases in volume) and the anterior
(which decreases in volume) sub-regions over time.
Acquiring structural MRI  data around the transitional
age of 9 months could also be informative in helping to
clarify what exactly occurs at this time, informing the major
theoretical accounts of infant memory which speculate that
the changes observed in infant memory around this age
are driven by hippocampal maturation. However, we could
also ask whether such changes are driven by simple time-
dependent maturation processes or are triggered by life
events such as the onset of independent locomotion (e.g.
Herbert et al., 2007).
MRI  in infants could, however, potentially provide
much more than structural correlates of hippocampalognitive Neuroscience 9 (2014) 12– 29
development. For instance, fMRI could enable us to track
the development of the episodic memory network. This
network is also activated during tasks of prospection, nav-
igation, theory of mind (Buckner and Carroll, 2007), the
mental construction of scenes (Hassabis et al., 2007a), and
scene viewing (Aly et al., 2013). The overlap between the
episodic memory network and the brain areas engaged by
these seemingly disparate cognitive processes is unsur-
prising when the complex nature of episodic memory is
considered. For instance, episodic memory depends upon
the successful development of a wide range of cogni-
tive functions including associative and relational binding
processes, a subjective sense of self in time, and a devel-
oped spatial cognition to support the ‘where’ component
of episodic memory. Spatial cognition alone (upon which
episodic memory is considered to reside; O’Keefe and
Nadel, 1978; Burgess et al., 2002; Maguire and Mullally,
2013) represents a complex set of cognitive processes
which appear to mature at different rates throughout
early and middle childhood (Sluzenski et al., 2004, 2006;
Townsend et al., 2010; Bauer et al., 2012; Ribordy et al.,
2013, see also Blue et al., 2013, for a discussion of recent
data from infant rhesus macaques). Scene viewing, which
is a completely passive task in combination with fMRI,
could enable us to track the emergence of the neural net-
work supporting the development of the episodic memory,
while simultaneously enabling us to establish the function-
ality of individual components within the episodic memory
network, such as the hippocampus, and to assess the cohe-
siveness of the network as a whole.
The ability to mentally construct scenes is known to
depend on the hippocampus in adults (Hassabis et al.,
2007b; Mullally et al., 2012). A marker of this is a cogni-
tive phenomenon known as boundary extension, whereby
people perceive more of a visual scene than was  presented
to them. This is a robust, consistent, implicit and auto-
matic cognitive effect that is found in adults (Intraub and
Richardson, 1989), children (Seamon et al., 2002) and even
in 3- to 7-month-old infants (Quinn and Intraub, 2007).
Using an fMRI adapted version of this paradigm (such as in
Chadwick et al., 2013) where again participants passively
view scenes, the emergence of these scene construction
processes, and their relationship with hippocampus and
the episodic network, could be explored in infancy. Stud-
ies using these kinds of scene viewing paradigms could
enable us to infer when adult-like episodic memory may  be
neurally feasible even if behavioural correlates of episodic
memory may  not be attainable until linguistic proficiency
is achieved.
Clearly, the above paradigms require the cooperation
of an awake participant which we  acknowledge is not an
easy feat in such a young population. One way to cir-
cumvent this challenge is to investigate the emergence
of the resting-state, as opposed to the episodic memory,
network. This is relevant because the episodic memory net-
work shares numerous similarities with the resting-state
network – a network of spontaneous and intrinsic brain
activity observed in the absence of any overt task perfor-
mance and during the early stages of sleep (Fukunaga et al.,
2006). A number of studies have already begun to explore
this network in very young infants. For instance, Gao et al.
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2009) found that 2-week-old infants exhibited a primi-
ive and incomplete default network that did not appear
o include the hippocampus. By 1-year of age this network
howed a marked increase in brain regions demonstrat-
ng connectivity but it was not until 2-years of age that
his network was comparable to that observed in adults
nd included the medial prefrontal cortex, the posterior
ingulate/retrosplenial cortices, inferior parietal and lat-
ral temporal cortices, and the hippocampus. Thus, a lack
f connectivity within the default network would presum-
bly also be evident in the episodic memory network, and
ould most likely disrupt the long-term consolidation pro-
esses necessary to establish enduring episodic memories
n regions such as the hippocampus and ventro-medial pre-
rontal cortex (Bonnici et al., 2012b), and could perhaps
xplain why very early episodic memories do not appear to
e successfully consolidated and accessible in adulthood.
racking development and time-locking these anatom-
cal and physiological changes to behavioural changes
bserved in memory development could greatly assist our
nderstanding of the neural substrates of mnemonic pro-
esses and potentially enable the distinct contributions of
omponents of this network to be elucidated.
Of note, functional imaging data are also being success-
ully acquired in awake infants via the use of functional
ear infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS; Meek et al., 1998).
his technique is growing in popularity (Lloyd-Fox et al.,
010; Vanderwert and Nelson, 2013) because it is light,
on-invasive and can accommodate a degree of move-
ent which enables an infant to remain seated on their
arent’s/carer’s lap throughout the experiment. However,
hile fNIRS measures the same haemodynamic response
s fMRI, it does not have the spatial resolution of fMRI or
he ability to penetrate to structures located deep within
he brain. To date, therefore, it is unsuited to studies whose
rimary goal is to measure the function of the hippocam-
us and surrounding structures, meaning that such studies
ust persevere with fMRI and the challenges it poses when
ttempting to acquire data from a non-sleeping infant.
imilar problems are associated with the use of scalp-
ecorded event-related potentials (ERPs). Although ERPs
ave been successfully utilised to address important ques-
ions about encoding, storage, and consolidation processes
n the immature brain (e.g. Bauer et al., 2003, 2006), the
nability of ERPs to penetrate to many of the episodic mem-
ry network structures, such as the hippocampus, renders
hem of limited use when addressing the above theoretical
uestions.
In addition to studying the neural correlates of infants’
emories, the results of Tustin and Hayne’s (2010) study
ndicate that the earliest memories of young children (<10-
ears-old) who appear capable of recollecting episodic
vents from early infancy, could provide important insights
nto how infants’ very earliest episodic memories are sup-
orted at a neural level, and how these differ from episodic
emories acquired from later time periods. It is possi-
le that an fMRI analysis technique known as multi-voxel
attern analysis that can be used to ‘decode’ represen-
ations of individual episodic memories in the human
ippocampus and elsewhere solely from patterns of fMRI
ctivity (Bonnici et al., 2012b; Chadwick et al., 2012), couldognitive Neuroscience 9 (2014) 12– 29 25
be particularly useful here. More specifically, it would
enable us to track the life of individual episodic memories,
hence potentially providing leverage on the phenomenon
of infantile amnesia, and allowing ideas such as the neu-
rogenic hypothesis to be tested in the developing human
brain. Additionally, the use of fMRI in early childhood, in
particular between the ages of 3- and 4-years, where a
significant increase in the long-term retention of episodic
memories is noted (e.g. Scarf et al., 2013; Morgan and
Hayne, 2011) could be helpful in exploring changes in the
episodic memory network that may  accompany the off-
set of infantile amnesia. Again, scene-related tasks such as
those utilised by Chadwick et al. (2013; see also Mullally
et al., 2012; Quinn and Intraub, 2007) could be advan-
tageous as they place no linguistic demands on young
participants in whom language abilities are still develop-
ing.
In summary, the data we  have reviewed above sug-
gest that infants are capable of impressive mnemonic feats.
However, these findings raise as many questions as they
answer. For instance, does the ability to imitate a sequence
of events, or indeed to successfully infer a relationship
between two items that have never before been seen
together, truly represent the early emergence of episodic
memory? If so, are these abilities related to the matura-
tional status of the hippocampus itself, or to the maturation
of alternate brain regions (e.g. perirhinal cortex)? Or  are
they related to a growing cohesion within the episodic
memory network (see also Johnson’s (2001) interactive
specialisation account; cited in Riggins, 2012)? These ques-
tions are important as the answers to them will form the
cornerstone upon which our understanding of the develop-
ment of episodic memory (which is believed to persist until
the end of the first decade of life; Bauer et al., 2012) will be
built. Moreover, addressing the paucity of neuroimaging
data in the infant memory literature will also help to deal
with the dearth of MRI  studies in the wider developmental
memory literature (Thomas and Jorgenson, 2012).
5. Conclusions
Memory is at the core of our cognitive and social
development. Understanding its ontogeny has important
implications for childcare and education, and for elucidat-
ing how memory is supported in the adult brain. The past
few decades have witnessed creative and ingenious ways
of examining infants in order to appreciate what they are
learning and if they remember, coupled with insights from
surface ERP recordings of cortical responses. Models and
testing of infant memory have been greatly influenced by a
taxonomy that was popularised in the adult literature in the
1980s, which emphasised the dichotomy between declar-
ative or explicit memory, and nondeclarative or implicit
memory. Because this taxonomy was  in large part driven
by data from amnesic patients with hippocampal damage,
this scheme has been used to make inferences about the
functionality of the infant hippocampus.However, in recent years the milieu has changed in
several respects. First, many of the basic tenets of the
memory taxonomy have been challenged leading to a gen-
eral consensus that distinctions such as explicit/implicit
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are no longer valid particularly in relation to hippocampal
function. Instead, there has been a burgeoning of theories
that seek to conceptualise the hippocampal contribution to
episodic memory in particular, and indeed to wider cogni-
tion, in novel ways that can better account for new data (for
more on this see Maguire and Mullally, 2013). Second, find-
ings from the infant memory field, examples of which we
reviewed here, undoubtedly indicate that even very young
infants have a more adept and flexible memory system than
was previously thought. Similarly, recent data also point to
the need to finesse our understanding of infantile amne-
sia. Third, neurobiological evidence from non-humans is
starting to accrue that is motivating new hypotheses about
hippocampal development, with potential implications for
interpreting infant memory data from humans.
Callaghan et al. (2014) recently attempted to renew
interest in understanding infantile amnesia, and urged the
use of new technologies in molecular biology to unpack the
molecular basis of this phenomenon. In a similar vein, here
we suggest that it may  be time for the infant memory field
to take on board new theories of memory and hippocampal
function, and embrace technologies such as MRI  that could
offer a means of progressing points of dispute. To be clear,
we are not advocating the abandonment of cognitive test-
ing of infants in favour of fMRI, rather we suggest that the
use of MRI  could help to motivate and constrain neurocog-
nitive theories of memory development in human infants.
Indeed, grounding infant memory in neurobiology may  be
even more important than for adults given the inability of
infants to disclose anything about their own capabilities.
The challenges of utilising techniques such as fMRI are sub-
stantial, however, the potential rewards we believe could
be manifold.
6. Conflicts of Interest
All authors declare that there is no conflict of interest.
Acknowledgement
EAM is supported by the Wellcome Trust.
References
Addante, R.J., Ranganath, C., Olichney, J., Yonelinas, A.P., 2012. Neurophys-
iological evidence for a recollection impairment in amnesia patients
that leaves familiarity intact. Neuropsychologia 50 (13), 3004–3014.
Adlam, A.L., Vargha-Khadem, F., Mishkin, M.,  de Haan, M.,  2005. Deferred
imitation of action sequences in developmental amnesia. Journal of
Cognitive Neuroscience 17 (2), 240–248.
Aly, M., Ranganath, C., Yonelinas, A.P., 2013. Detecting changes in scenes:
the hippocampus is critical for strength-based perception. Neuron 78,
1127–1137.
Anderson, A.W., Marois, R., Colson, E.R., Peterson, B.S., Duncan, C.C.,
Ehrenkranz, R.A., et al., 2001. Neonatal auditory activation detected by
functional magnetic resonance imaging. Magnetic Resonance Imaging
19  (1), 1–5.
Bachevalier, J., 1992. Cortical versus limbic immaturity: relationship to
infantile amnesia. In: Gunnar, M.R., Nelson, C.A. (Eds.), Developmental
Behavioral Neuroscience. Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ, pp. 129–153.
Bachevalier, J., Mishkin, M.,  1982. The development of memories vs. habits
in infant monkeys. Paper Presented to the International Organization
of Psychophysiology.
Barr, R., Dowden, A., Hayne, H., 1996. Developmental changes in deferred
imitation by 6- to 24-month-old infants. Infant Behavior and Devel-
opment 19, 159–170.ognitive Neuroscience 9 (2014) 12– 29
Barr, R., Marrott, H., Rovee-Collier, C., 2003. The role of sensory pre-
conditioning in memory retrieval by preverbal infants. Learning and
Behavior 31 (2), 111–123.
Barr, R., Rovee-Collier, C., Campanella, J.L., 2005. Retrieval protracts
deferred imitation by 6-month-olds. Infancy 7, 263–283.
Barr, R., Rovee-Collier, C., Learmonth, A., 2011. Potentiation in young
infants: the origin of the prior knowledge effect? Memory and Cogni-
tion 39 (4), 625–636.
Bauer, P.J., 2006. Constructing a past in infancy: a neuro-developmental
account. Trends in Cognitive Science 10 (4), 175–181.
Bauer, P.J., 2008. Toward a neuro-developmental account of the devel-
opment of declarative memory. Developmental Psychobiology 50 (1),
19–31.
Bauer, P.J., Wiebe, S.A., Carver, L.J., Waters, J.M., Nelson, C.A., 2003. Devel-
opments in long-term explicit memory late in the first year of life:
behavioral and electrophysiological indices. Psychological Science 14
(6), 629–635.
Bauer, P.J., Wiebe, S.A., Carver, L.J., Lukowski, A.F., Haight, J.C., Waters,
J.M., et al., 2006. Electrophysiological indexes of encoding and behav-
ioral indexes of recall: examining relations and developmental change
late in the first year of life. Developmental Neuropsychology 29 (2),
293–320.
Bauer, P.J., Doydum, A.O., Pathman, T., Larkina, M.,  Güler, O.E., Burch, M.,
2012. It’s all about location, location, location: children’s memory for
the where of personally experienced events. Journal of Experimental
Child Psychology 113 (4), 510–522.
Bayer, S.A., 1980. The development of the hippocampal region in the rat. I.
Neurogenesis examined with H3-thymidine autoradiography. Journal
of Comparative Neurology 190 (1), 87–114.
Blue, S.N., Kazama, A.M., Bachevalier, J., 2013. Development of mem-
ory  for spatial locations and object/place associations in infant
rhesus macaques with and without neonatal hippocampal lesions.
Journal of the International Neuropsychological Society 19 (10),
1053–1064.
Boller, K., 1997. Preexposure effects on infant learning and memory.
Developmental Psychobiology 31 (2), 93–105.
Bonnici, H.M., Chadwick, M.J., Kumaran, D., Hassabis, D., Weiskopf, N.,
Maguire, E.A., 2012a. Multi-voxel pattern analysis in human hip-
pocampal subfields. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 6, 290.
Bonnici, H.M., Chadwick, M.J., Lutti, A., Hassabis, D., Weiskopf, N.,
Maguire, E.A., 2012b. Detecting representations of recent and remote
autobiographical memories in vmPFC and hippocampus. Journal of
Neuroscience 32 (47), 16982–16991.
Buckner, R.L., Carroll, D.C., 2007. Self-projection and the brain. Trends in
Cognitive Science 11 (2), 49–57.
Bunuel, L., 1983. My  Last Sigh. Knopf, New York.
Burgess, N., Maguire, E.A., O’Keefe, J., 2002. The human hippocampus and
spatial and episodic memory. Neuron 35 (4), 625–641.
Busby, J., Suddendorf, T., 2005. Recalling yesterday and predicting tomor-
row. Cognitive Development 20 (3), 362–372.
Bushnell, I.W.R., Sai, F., Mullin, J.T., 1989. Neonatal recognition of
the  mother’s face. British Journal of Developmental Psychology 7,
3–15.
Callaghan, B.L., Li, S., Richardson, R., 2014. The elusive engram: what can
infantile amnesia tell us about memory? Trends in Neurosciences 37,
47–53.
Campanella, J.L., Rovee-Collier, C., 2005. Latent learning and deferred imi-
tation at 3 months. Infancy 7, 243–262.
Carey, S., Bartlett, E., 1978. Acquiring a single new word. Papers and
Reports on Child Language Development 15, 17–29.
Carver, L.J., Bauer, P.J., 2001. The dawning of a past: the emergence of long-
term explicit memory in infancy. Journal of Experimental Psychology
General 130 (4), 726–745.
Carver, L.J., Bauer, P.J., Nelson, C.A., 2000. Associations between infant
brain activity and recall memory. Developmental Science 3 (2),
234–246.
Chadwick, M.J., Bonnici, H.M., Maguire, E.A., 2012. Decoding information
in the human hippocampus: a user’s guide. Neuropsychologia 50 (13),
3107–3121.
Chadwick, M.J., Mullally, S.L., Maguire, E.A., 2013. The hippocampus
extrapolates beyond the view in scenes: an fMRI study of boundary
extension. Cortex 49 (8), 2067–2079.
Chun, M.M., Phelps, E.A., 1999. Memory deficits for implicit contextual
information in amnesic subjects with hippocampal damage. Nature
Neuroscience 2 (9), 844–847.
Clayton, N.S., Dickinson, A., 1998. Episodic-like memory during cache
recovery by scrub jays. Nature 395, 272–274.
Clayton, N.S., Bussey, T.J., Dickinson, A., 2003. Can animals recall the past
and  plan for the future? Nature Reviews Neuroscience 4 (8), 685–691.
mental C
C
C
C
C
C
D
D
D
D
E
E
E
F
F
F
F
F
F
G
G
G
G
G
G
G
G
HS.L. Mullally, E.A. Maguire / Develop
ohen, N.J., 1984. Amnesia and the distinction between procedural and
declarative knowledge. In: Butters, N., Squire, L.R. (Eds.), The Neu-
ropsychology of Memory. New York, Guilford Press.
ohen, L.B., Gelber, E.R., 1975. Infant visual memory. In: Cohen, L.B., Sala-
patek, P. (Eds.), Infant Perception. New York, Academic Press.
ohen, N.J., Squire, L.R., 1980. Preserved learning and retention of pattern-
analyzing skill in amnesia: dissociation of knowing how and knowing
that. Science 210 (4466), 207–210.
uevas, K., Rovee-Collier, C., Learmonth, A.E., 2006. Infants form associ-
ations between memory representations of stimuli that are absent.
Psychological Science 17 (6), 543–549.
uevas, K., Giles, A., Rovee-Collier, C., 2009. Developmental shifts in sen-
sory preconditioning: deferred imitation, looking time, verbal and
motor skills, and number of trials. In: Paper Presented at the Biannual
Meeting of the Society for Research in Child Development, Denver, CO.
avis, J., Rovee-Collier, C., 1983. Alleviated forgetting of a learned contin-
gency in 8-week-old infants. Developmental Psychology 19, 353–365.
eCasper, A.J., Fifer, W.P., 1980. Of human bonding: newborns prefer their
mothers’ voices. Science 208 (4448), 1174–1176.
ehaene-Lambertz, G., Montavont, A., Jobert, A., Allirol, L., Dubois, J.,
Hertz-Pannier, L., et al., 2010. Language or music, mother or Mozart?
Structural and environmental influences on infants’ language net-
works. Brain and Language 114 (2), 53–65.
üzel, E., Vargha-Khadem, F., Heinze, H.J., Mishkin, M.,  2001. Brain activity
evidence for recognition without recollection after early hippocampal
damage. Proceedings of the National Academy of Science USA 98 (14),
8101–8106.
ichenbaum, H., 1997. Declarative memory: insights from cognitive neu-
robiology. Annual Review of Psychology 48, 547–572.
ichenbaum, H., 2004. Hippocampus: cognitive processes and neural
representations that underlie declarative memory. Neuron 44 (1),
109–120.
rgorul, C., Eichenbaum, H., 2004. The hippocampus and memory for what,
where, and when. Learning and Memory 11 (4), 397–405.
agan 3rd, J.F., 1971. Infants’ recognition memory for a series of visual
stimuli. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 11 (2), 244–250.
agan 3rd, J.F., 1973. Infants’ delayed recognition memory and forgetting.
Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 16 (3), 424–450.
agan, J.F., 1984. Infant memory: history, current trends, relations to
cognitive psychology. In: Moscovitch, M.  (Ed.), Infant Memory: Its
Relation to Normal and Pathological Memory in Humans and Other
Animals. Springer, New York, pp. 1–27.
antz, R.L., 1964. Visual experience in infants: decreased attention to
familiar patterns relative to novel ones. Science 146 (3644), 668–670.
rankland, P.W., Kohler, S., Josselyn, S.A., 2013. Hippocampal neurogenesis
and forgetting. Trends in Neuroscience 36, 497–503.
ukunaga, M.,  Horovitz, S.G., van Gelderen, P., de Zwart, J.A., Jansma, J.M.,
Ikonomidou, V.N., et al., 2006. Large-amplitude, spatially correlated
fluctuations in BOLD fMRI signals during extended rest and early sleep
stages. Magnetic Resonance Imaging 24 (8), 979–992.
affan, D., 1974. Recognition impaired and association intact in the mem-
ory  of monkeys after transection of the fornix. Journal of Comparative
and  Physiological Psychology 86 (6), 1100–1109.
ao, W.,  Zhu, H., Giovanello, K.S., Smith, J.K., Shen, D., Gilmore, J.H., et al.,
2009. Evidence on the emergence of the brain’s default network from
2-week-old to 2-year-old healthy pediatric subjects. Proceedings of
the National Academy of Science USA 106 (16), 6790–6795.
errish, C.J., Alberts, J.R., 1996. Environmental temperature modulates
onset of independent feeding: warmer is sooner. Developmental Psy-
chobiology 29 (6), 483–495.
ogtay, N., Nugent, T.F., Herman, D.H., Ordonez, A., Greenstein, D., Hayashi,
K.M., Clasen, L., Tonga, A.W., Giedd, J.N., Rapoport, J.L., Thomson, P.M.,
2006. Dynamic mapping of normal human hippocampal develop-
ment. Hippocampus 16 (1), 664–672.
ottfried, A.W., Rose, S.A., Bridger, W.H., 1977. Cross-modal transfer in
human infants. Child Development 48 (1), 118–123.
raf, P., Schacter, D.L., 1985. Implicit and explicit memory for new asso-
ciations in normal and amnesic subjects. Journal of Experimental
Psychology Learning Memory and Cognition 11 (3), 501–518.
reco, C., Rovee-Collier, C., Hayne, H., Griesler, P., Earley, L., 1986.
Ontogeny of early event memory: I. Forgetting and retrieval by 2- and
3-month-olds. Infant Behavior and Development 9, 441–460.
ross, J., Hayne, H., Herbert, J., Sowerby, P., 2002. Measuring infant mem-
ory: does the ruler matter? Developmental Psychobiology 40 (2),
183–192.
annula, D.E., Ryan, J.D., Tranel, D., Cohen, N.J., 2007. Rapid onset rela-
tional memory effects are evident in eye movement behaviour, but
not  in hippocampal amnesia. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 19
(10), 1690–1705.ognitive Neuroscience 9 (2014) 12– 29 27
Hartshorn, K., 2003. Reinstatement maintains a memory in human infants
for  1(1/2) years. Developmental Psychobiology 42 (3), 269–282.
Hartshorn, K., Rovee-Collier, C., 1997. Infant learning and long-term mem-
ory  at 6 months: a confirming analysis. Developmental Psychobiology
30,  71–85.
Haskins, A.L., Yonelinas, A.P., Quamme, J.R., Ranganath, C., 2008. Perirhinal
cortex supports encoding and familiarity-based recognition of novel
associations. Neuron 59 (4), 554–560.
Hassabis, D., Kumaran, D., Maguire, E.A., 2007a. Using imagination to
understand the neural basis of episodic memory. Journal of Neuro-
science 27 (52), 14365–14374.
Hassabis, D., Kumaran, D., Vann, S.D., Maguire, E.A., 2007b. Patients with
hippocampal amnesia cannot imagine new experiences. Proceedings
of  the National Academy of Science USA 104 (5), 1726–1731.
Hayne, H., 2004. Infant memory development: implications for childhood
amnesia. Developmental Review 24, 33–73.
Hayne, H., 2007a. Verbal recall of preverbal memories: implications for the
clinic and the courtroom. In: Garry, M.,  Hayne, H. (Eds.), Do Justice and
Let the Sky Fall: Elizabeth F. Loftus and Her Contributions to Science,
Law, and Academic Freedom. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah,
NJ, pp. 79–103.
Hayne, H., 2007b. Infant memory development: new questions new
answers. In: Oakes, L.M., Bauer, P.J. (Eds.), Short- and Long-
Term Memory in Infancy and Early Childhood: Taking the First
Steps Toward Remembering. Oxford University Press, New York,
pp. 209–239.
Hayne, H., Imuta, K., 2011. Episodic memory in 3- and 4-year-old children.
Developmental Psychobiology 53 (3), 317–322.
Hayne, H., Boniface, J., Barr, R., 2000. The development of declarative
memory in human infants: age-related changes in deferred imitation.
Behavioral Neuroscience 114 (1), 77–83.
Herbert, J., Gross, J., Hayne, H., 2007. Crawling is associated with more flex-
ible memory retrieval by 9-month-old infants. Developmental Science
10  (2), 183–189.
Hildreth, K., Hill, D., 2003. Retrieval difficulty and retention of reactivated
memories over the first year of life. Developmental Psychobiology 43
(3),  216–229.
Hill, W.L., Borovsky, D., Rovee-Collier, C., 1988. Continuities in infant mem-
ory development. Developmental Psychobiology 21 (1), 43–62.
Hirsh, R., 1974. The hippocampus and contextual retrieval of information
from memory: a theory. Behavioral Biology 12 (4), 421–444.
Howe, M.L., Courage, M.L., 1993. On resolving the enigma of infantile
amnesia. Psychological Bulletin 113 (2), 305–326.
Hsu, V.C., Rovee-Collier, C., 2006. Memory reactivation in the second year
of  life. Infant Behavior and Development 29 (1), 91–107.
Huttenlocher, P.R., Dabholkar, A.S., 1997. Regional differences in synapto-
genesis in human cerebral cortex. Journal of Comparative Neurology
387 (2), 167–178.
Intraub, H., Richardson, M.,  1989. Wide-angle memories of close-up
scenes. Journal of Experimental Psychology Learning Memory and
Cognition 15 (2), 179–187.
Jack, F., Simcock, G., Hayne, H., 2012. Magic memories: young children’s
verbal recall after a 6-year delay. Child Development 83 (1), 159–172.
James, W.,  1890. Principles of Psychology. Holt, New York.
Johnson, M.H., 2001. Functional brain development in humans. Nature
Reviews Neuroscience 2 (7), 475–483.
Jones, E.J.H., Pascalis, O., Eacott, M.J., Herbert, J.S., 2011. Visual recognition
memory across contexts. Developmental Science 14 (1), 135–147.
Josselyn, S.A., Frankland, P.W., 2012. Infantile amnesia: a neurogenic
hypothesis. Learning and Memory 19 (9), 423–433.
Kagan, J., Hamburg, M.,  1981. The enhancement of memory in the first
year. Journal of Genetic Psychology 138, 3–14.
Konkel, A., Cohen, N.J., 2009. Relational memory and the hippocam-
pus: representations and methods. Frontiers in Neuroscience 3 (2),
166–174.
Koski, J., Olson, I.R., Newcombe, N.S., 2013. Tracking the eyes to see what
children remember. Memory 21 (3), 396–407.
Langston, R.F., Ainge, J.A., Couey, J.J., Canto, C.B., Bjerknes, T.L., Witter, M.P.,
Moser, E.I., Moser, M.B., 2010. Development of the spatial representa-
tion system in the rat. Science 328, 1576–1580.
Lavenex, P., Banta Lavenex, P., 2013. Building hippocampal circuits to learn
and remember: insights into the development of human memory.
Behavioral Brain Research 254, 8–21.
Leroy, F., Glasel, H., Dubois, J., Hertz-Pannier, L., Thirion, B., Mangin, J.F.,
et  al., 2011. Early maturation of the linguistic dorsal pathway in human
infants. Journal of Neuroscience 31 (4), 1500–1506.
Lloyd-Fox, S., Blasi, A., Elwell, C.E., 2010. Illuminating the developing brain:
the past, present and future of functional near infrared spectroscopy.
Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 34 (3), 269–284.
mental C28 S.L. Mullally, E.A. Maguire / Develop
MacFarlane, A., 1975. Olfaction in the development of social preferences
in the human neonate. Ciba Foundation Symposia 33, 103–117.
Maguire, E.A., Mullally, S.L., 2013. The hippocampus: a manifesto for
change. Journal of Experimental Psychology General 142, 1180–1189.
Markson, L., Bloom, P., 1997. Evidence against a dedicated system for word
learning in children. Nature 385 (6619), 813–815.
Martin-Ordas, G., Haun, D., Colmenares, F., Call, J., 2010. Keeping track of
time: evidence for episodic-like memory in great apes. Animal Cogni-
tion  13 (2), 331–340.
McDonough, L., Mandler, J.M., McKee, R.D., Squire, L.R., 1995. The deferred
imitation task as a nonverbal measure of declarative memory. Pro-
ceedings of the National Academy of Science USA 92 (16), 7580–
7584.
McKee, R.D., Squire, L.R., 1993. On the development of declarative
memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology Learning Memory and
Cognition 19 (2), 397–404.
Meek, J.H., Firbank, M.,  Elwell, C.E., Atkinson, J., Braddick, O., Wyatt,
J.S., 1998. Regional hemodynamic responses to visual stimulation in
awake infants. Pediatric Research 43 (6), 840–843.
Meltzoff, A.N., 1988. Imitation of televised models by infants. Child Devel-
opment 59 (5), 1221–1229.
Milner, B., 1962. Les troubles de la mémoire accompagnant des lésions
hippocampiques bilatérales. In: Physiologie de l’hippocampe. Cen-
tre  National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris, pp. 257–272, English
translation: Milner B., Glickman S. (Eds.), 1965. Van Nostrand, Prince-
ton, pp. 97–111.
Morgan, K., Hayne, H., 2011. Age-related changes in visual recognition
memory during infancy and early childhood. Developmental Psy-
chobiology 53, 157–165.
Mullally, S.L., Maguire, E.A., 2013. Memory, imagination and predicting
the future: a common brain mechanism? Neuroscientist (in press).
Mullally, S.L., Intraub, H., Maguire, E.A., 2012. Attenuated boundary exten-
sion produces a paradoxical memory advantage in amnesic patients.
Current Biology 22 (4), 261–268.
Nadel, L., Zola-Morgan, S., 1984. Infantile amnesia: a neurobiological per-
spective. In: Moscovitch, M.  (Ed.), Infant Memory: Its Relation to
Normal and Pathological Memory in Humans and Other Animals.
Springer, New York, pp. 145–171.
Nelson, C.A., 1995. The ontogeny of human memory: a cognitive neuro-
science perspective. Developmental Psychology 31, 723–738.
Nelson, C.A., 1997. The neurobiological basis of early memory develop-
ment. In: Cowan, N. (Ed.), The Development of Memory in Childhood.
Psychology Press, Hove, East Sussex, pp. 41–82.
Newcombe, N.S., Lloyd, M.E., Balcomb, F., 2012. Conceptualizing the
development of recollection: episodic memory and binding in young
children. In: Ghetti, S., Bauer, P.J. (Eds.), Origins and Development of
Recollection. Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 73–100.
O’Keefe, J., Nadel, L., 1978. The Hippocampus as a Cognitive Map. The
Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Olsen, G.M., 1976. An information-processing analysis of visual memory
and  habituation in infants. In: Tighe, T.J., Leaton, R.N. (Eds.), Habitua-
tion. Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ.
Paller, K.A., Kutas, M.,  1992. Brain potentials during memory retrieval
provide neurophysiological support for the distinction between con-
scious recollection and priming. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 4
(4),  375–392.
Pascalis, O., Hunkin, N.M., Holdstock, J.S., Isaac, C.L., Mayes, A.R., 2004.
Visual paired comparison performance is impaired in a patient with
selective hippocampal lesions and relatively intact item recognition.
Neuropsychologia 42 (10), 1293–1300.
Peterson, C., Grant, V.V., Boland, L.D., 2005. Childhood amnesia in children
and adolescents: their earliest memories. Memory 13 (6), 622–637.
Piaget, J., 1928. Judgement and Reasoning in the Child. Routledge and
Kegal Paul, London.
Quamme, J.R., Yonelinas, A.P., Norman, K.A., 2007. Effect of unitization on
associative recognition in amnesia. Hippocampus 17 (3), 192–200.
Quinn, P.C., Intraub, H., 2007. Perceiving outside the box occurs early in
development: evidence for boundary extension in three- to seven-
month-old infants. Child Development 78 (1), 324–334.
Rakic, P., Nowakowski, R.S., 1981. The time origin of neurons in the
hippocampal region of the rhesus monkey. Journal of Comparative
Neurology 196 (1), 99–128.
Raschle, N., Zuk, J., Ortiz-Mantilla, S., Sliva, D.D., Franceschi, A., Grant, P.E.,
et  al., 2012. Pediatric neuroimaging in early childhood and infancy:
challenges and practical guidelines. Annals of the New York Academy
of Science 1252, 43–50.
Reynolds, B., Rovee-Collier, C.,2005. Forgetting of latent associations in
the second half-year of life. In: Aresti Undergraduate Research Con-
ference. Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ.ognitive Neuroscience 9 (2014) 12– 29
Ribordy, F., Jabès, A., Lavenex, P.B., Lavenex, P., 2013. Development of allo-
centric spatial memory abilities in children from 18 months to 5 years
of age. Cognitive Psychology 66 (1), 1–29.
Richmond, J., Nelson, C.A., 2007. Accounting for change in declara-
tive memory: a cognitive neuroscience perspective. Developmental
Review 27 (3), 349–373.
Richmond, J., Nelson, C.A., 2009. Relational memory during infancy: evi-
dence from eye tracking. Developmental Science 12 (4), 549–556.
Riggins, T., 2012. Building blocks of recollection. In: Ghetti, S., Bauer, P.J.
(Eds.), Origins and Development of Recollection. Oxford University
Press, New York, pp. 42–72.
Robinson, A., Pascalis, O., 2004. Development of flexible visual recog-
nition memory in human infants. Developmental Science 7 (1),
527–533.
Rose, S.A., 1983. Differential rates of visual information processing in full-
term and preterm infants. Child Development 54 (5), 1189–1198.
Rovee-Collier, C., 1997. Dissociations in infant memory: rethinking the
development of implicit and explicit memory. Psychological Review
104 (3), 467–498.
Rovee-Collier, C., Cuevas, K., 2009. Multiple memory systems are unneces-
sary to account for infant memory development: an ecological model.
Developmental Psychology 45 (1), 160–174.
Rovee-Collier, C., Fagen, J.W., 1981. The retrieval of memory in early
infancy. In: Lipsitt, L.P. (Ed.), Advances in Infancy Research, vol. 1.
Ablex, Norwood, NJ.
Rovee-Collier, C., Hayne, H., 2000. Memory in infancy and early childhood.
In:  Tulving, E., Craik, F.I.M. (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of memory.
Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 267–282.
Rovee-Collier, C., Giles, A., 2010. Why  a neuromaturational model of mem-
ory fails: exuberant learning in early infancy. Behavioural Processes
83 (2), 197–206.
Rovee-Collier, C., Sullivan, M.W., Enright, M.,  Lucas, D., Fagen, J.W., 1980.
Reactivation of infant memory. Science 208 (4448), 1159–1161.
Rovee-Collier, C., Hartshorn, K., DiRubbo, M.,  1999. Long-term main-
tenance of infant memory. Developmental Psychobiology 35 (2),
91–102.
Russell, J., Alexis, D., Clayton, N., 2010. Episodic future thinking in 3- to
5-year-old children: the ability to think of what will be needed from
a  different point of view. Cognition 114 (1), 56–71.
Ryan, J.D., Cohen, N.J., 2004. The nature of change detection and online
representations of scenes. Journal of Experimental Psychology Human
Perception and Performance 30 (5), 988–1015.
Ryan, J.D., Althoff, R.R., Whitlow, S., Cohen, N.J., 2000. Amnesia is a deficit
in relational memory. Psychological Science 11 (6), 454–461.
Salwiczek, L.H., Watanabe, A., Clayton, N.S., 2010. Ten years of research
into avian models of episodic-like memory and its implications for
developmental and comparative cognition. Behavioral Brain Research
215 (2), 221–234.
Sameroff, A.J., 1971. Can conditioned responses be established in the new-
born infant? Developmental Psychology 5, 1–12.
Scarf, D., Gross, J., Colombo, M.,  2013. To have and to hold: episodic mem-
ory in 3- and 4-year-old children. Developmental Psychobiology 55
(2), 125–132.
Schacter, D.L., Moscovitch, M.,  1984. Infants, amnesics, and dissociable
memory systems. In: Moscovitch, M.  (Ed.), Infant Memory: Its Relation
to  Normal and Pathological Memory in Humans and Other Animals.
Springer, New York, pp. 173–216.
Scoville, W.B., Milner, B., 1957. Loss of recent memory after bilateral hip-
pocampal lesions. Journal of Neurology Neurosurgery and Psychiatry
20  (1), 11–21.
Seamon, J.G., Schlegel, S.E., Hiester, P.M., Landau, S.M., Blumenthal,
B.F., 2002. Misremembering pictured objects: people of all ages
demonstrate the boundary extension illusion. American Journal of
Psychology 115 (2), 151–167.
Seress, L., 2001. Morphological changes of the human hippocampal for-
mation from midgestation to early childhood. In: Nelson, C.E., Luciana,
M.  (Eds.), Handbook of Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience. MIT
Press, Cambridge, MA,  pp. 45–48.
Seress, L., Abraham, H., 2008. Pre- and postnatal morphological develop-
ment of the human hippocampal formation. In: Nelson, C.A., Luciana,
M.  (Eds.), Fundamentals of Developmental Neurobiology. MIT  Press,
Cambridge, MA, pp. 187–211.
Seress, L., Gulyas, A.I., Ferrer, I., Tunon, T., Soriano, E., Freund, T.F., 1993.
Distribution, morphological features, and synaptic connections of
parvalbumin- and calbindin D28K-immunoreactive neurons in the
human hippocampal formation. Journal of Comparative Neurology
337 (2), 208–230.
Sharon, T., Moscovitch, M., Gilboa, A., 2011. Rapid neocortical acqui-
sition of long-term arbitrary associations independent of the
mental C
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
TS.L. Mullally, E.A. Maguire / Develop
hippocampus. Proceedings of the National Academy of Science USA
108  (3), 1146–1151.
heingold, K., Teeney, Y., 1982. Memory for a salient childhood event. In:
Neisser, U. (Ed.), Memory Observed. Freeman, San Francisco, CA, pp.
201–212.
luzenski, J., Newcombe, N.S., Satlow, E., 2004. Knowing where things are
in  the second year of life: implications for hippocampal development.
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 16 (8), 1443–1451.
luzenski, J., Newcombe, N.S., Kovacs, S.L., 2006. Binding, relational mem-
ory, and recall of naturalistic events: a developmental perspective.
Journal of Experimental Psychology Learning Memory and Cognition
32 (1), 89–100.
pear, N.E., 1984. The future of learning and memory from a psychobi-
ological perspective. In: Sarris, V., Parducci, A. (Eds.), Perspectives in
Psychological Experimentation. Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ, pp. 87–103.
quire, L.R., 2004. Memory systems of the brain: a brief history and current
perspective. Neurobiol Learning and Memory 82 (3), 171–177.
quire, L.R., Kandel, E.R., 1999. Memory: From Mind to Molecules. Scien-
tific American Library, New York.
quire, L.R., Schacter, D.L. (Eds.), 2002. Neuropsychology of Memory. , 3rd
ed. Guilford Press, New York.
quire, L.R., Zola-Morgan, S., 1983. The neurology of memory: the case
for correspondence between the findings for human and nonhuman
primate. In: Deutsch, J.A. (Ed.), The Physiological Basis of Memory.
Academic Press, New York, pp. 199–268.
quire, L.R., Zola-Morgan, S., 1988. Memory: brain systems and behavior.
Trends in Neurosciences 11 (4), 170–175.quire, L.R., Zola-Morgan, S., 1996. Structure and function of declara-
tive and nondeclarative memory systems. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Science USA 93 (24), 13515–13522.
homas, K.M., Jorgenson, L., 2012. Development of remembering: brain
development and neuroimaging evidence. In: Ghetti, S., Bauer, P.J.ognitive Neuroscience 9 (2014) 12– 29 29
(Eds.), Origins and Development of Recollection. Oxford University
Press, New York, pp. 219–241.
Townsend, E.L., Richmond, J.L., Vogel-Farley, V.K., Thomas, K., 2010.
Medial temporal lobe memory in childhood: developmental transi-
tions. Developmental Science 13 (5), 738–751.
Tulving, E., 1972. Episodic and semantic memory. In: Tulving, E., Donald-
son,  W.  (Eds.), Organization of Memory. Academic Press, New York,
NY, pp. 381–403.
Tulving, E., 1985. Memory and consciousness. Canadian Psychology 26,
1–12.
Tulving, E., 2002. Episodic memory: from mind to brain. Annual Review
of Psychology 53, 1–25.
Tulving, E., 2005. Episodic memory and autonoesis: uniquely human? In:
Terrace, H.S., Metcalfe, J. (Eds.), The Missing Link in Cognition: Origins
of  Self-Reflective Consciousness. Oxford University Press, New York,
pp. 3–56.
Tustin, K., Hayne, H., 2010. Defining the boundary: age-related changes in
childhood amnesia. Developmental Psychology 46 (5), 1049–1061.
Usher, J.A., Neisser, U., 1993. Childhood amnesia and the beginnings of
memory for four early life events. Journal of Experimental Psychology
General 122 (2), 155–165.
Vanderwert, R.E., Nelson, C.A., 2013. The use of near-infrared spectroscopy
in the study of typical and atypical development. Neuroimage 85,
264–271.
Wills, T.J., Cacucci, F., Burgess, N., O’Keete, J., 2010. Development of the hip-
pocampal cognitive map  in preweanling rats. Science 328, 1573–1576.
Wills, T.J., Barry, C., Cacucci, F., 2012. The abrupt development of adult-
like  grid cell firing in the medial entorhinal cortex. Frontiers in Neural
Circuits 6, 21.
Zajac, R., Hayne, H., 2003. I don’t think that’s what really happened: the
effect of cross-examination on the accuracy of children’s reports. Jour-
nal of Experimental Psychology Applied 9 (3), 187–195.
